MSPs must rediscover the idea that they are legislators before they are party representatives

When the governing party holds both senior positions on key committees such as Finance, Criminal Justice and Public Service Reform, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that executive dominance is being reproduced within the very structures designed to constrain it.

Whatever the intention, the appearance, and increasingly the practice, is of a Parliament struggling to assert itself against the Government it is meant to scrutinise. Committees sit at the heart of what makes a legislature effective. Good scrutiny rarely produces viral social media clips, but it does produce better law. When committees function properly, they identify unintended consequences, expose weak assumptions and improve legislation before it reaches the statute book. When they fail, Parliament becomes weaker and government becomes less accountable.

When the Scottish Parliament reconvened in 1999, its architects consciously sought to avoid reproducing the adversarial culture associated with Westminster. Scotland’s new legislature would embrace what was described as a ”new politics” built upon openness, participation and consensus.

The committee system was central to this vision. In the absence of a second chamber, committees would bear much of the responsibility for legislative oversight. They were intended not merely to examine legislation but to gather evidence, conduct inquiries and improve policy through detailed consideration. The aspiration was that MSPs would leave partisan instincts at the door and focus instead upon testing evidence and improving outcomes.

For a time, this ambition appeared achievable. Yet the political culture that gave birth to devolution has changed dramatically. The optimism of the late 1990s was a product of its age. Across much of the Western world, economic growth appeared stable, globalisation seemed beneficial and the future looked promising. The financial crisis of 2007-08 altered that outlook.

As economic insecurity spread, so too did questions of identity and sovereignty. Across Europe and North America, politics became increasingly shaped by debates about belonging and national purpose. Citizens sought certainty in an uncertain world, and political parties increasingly defined themselves by what they opposed rather than what they sought to build.

Scotland was no exception. Here, the constitutional question intensified the trend. The SNP increasingly defined itself against Westminster, while Conservatives defined themselves against independence. Other parties likewise sought distinction through opposition rather than proposition.

This is not to argue that political parties should not seek an identity. They must do so if voters are to understand what they stand for. But when opposition becomes identity itself, politics risks becoming less about solving problems and more about sustaining division. The consequence is a culture that rewards tribal loyalty over scrutiny, and encourages conflict where institutions require cooperation.

The consequences are visible throughout parliamentary committees. Votes frequently divide along predictable party lines. Government backbenchers often ask questions designed to support ministers, while opposition members sometimes use evidence sessions to score political points rather than gather evidence. This misunderstands the purpose of committees.

Parliamentary chamber debate should contain an element of theatre. Political disagreement is inevitable and often healthy. Voters deserve clarity about competing visions and priorities. Parliamentary committees serve a different function entirely. Their role is not to perform disagreement but to investigate reality.

Members should spend hours examining wording, testing assumptions, questioning financial projections and analysing evidence. They should be suspicious by instinct and meticulous by habit. Yet they are increasingly asked to undertake this vital work within structures that are no longer fit for purpose.

The original model of all-encompassing committees asks too much of too few people. Committees are expected simultaneously to scrutinise legislation, examine amendments, gather evidence, conduct inquiries and produce reports. Given the limited time available, the workload has become unsustainable.

Reform of the committee system is required.

First, committee leadership must become more independent from government control. The current d’Hondt allocation system advantages governing parties because ministers are included within the parliamentary calculations. Excluding ministers from those calculations would better reflect the scrutiny role committees are intended to perform. Equally important, no party, especially the one of government, should simultaneously hold both the convenor and deputy convenor positions on any committee.

Second, Holyrood should abandon the all-encompassing committee model. Subject committees should focus on evidence gathering, inquiries and policy development. Separate bill committees should undertake legislative oversight. This division would allow greater specialisation and more thorough examination of legislation.

Most importantly, however, Scotland requires a cultural change. MSPs must rediscover the idea that they are legislators before they are party representatives. This requires recognition that committee rooms serve a higher purpose than partisan competition. Members should enter them asking not how to advance party interests, but how to improve legislation and strengthen governance.

Such a shift would not merely improve committees. It would improve Scotland. Better scrutiny produces better law. Better law produces better public services. Greater accountability produces stronger government. Stronger institutions foster greater public trust.

Ultimately, the debate about committee reform is not really about procedures at all. It is about whether the Scottish Parliament wishes to become the institution its founders imagined: a confident legislature capable of scrutinising power, improving legislation and serving the national interest.

A strong Parliament requires strong committees. If Holyrood can rediscover that principle, it will not simply strengthen its committee system. It will strengthen Scottish democracy itself.

James Bundy is a Scottish Conservative Councillor for Falkirk Council and writer on Parliamentary Reform at Holyrood